

#### S. $\mathbf{E}$

# Policy

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### President Clinton's May Snowjob

## **President Clinton Misleads** the American People on Missile Defense

President Clinton's commencement address at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy on May 22 is but one more example of his "say one thing, do another" presidency. Even a casual examination of the President's speech shows that he misrepresented and misled the American people on the need for — and the Administration's commitment to — defending America.

In sharp contrast to the President, Senator Dole and the Congressional Majority have introduced legislation calling for the deployment of a national missile defense (NMD) system by the year 2003.

Below are the President's statements on ballistic missile defense made during the commencement address, and a few reality checks.

## President's Statement: Commitment to Missile Defense

"... We're spending \$3 billion a year on a strong, sensible national missile defense program based on real threats and pragmatic responses."

## Reality Check

President Clinton does not even know the details of his own budget plan for missile defense. The FY 1997 Clinton budget request is only \$2.8 billion, not \$3 billion, as the President asserts, and this funding level is for all ballistic missile defense programs (which include theater missile defense, cooperative efforts with European allies and Israel, as well as the national missile defense program), not just the NMD system.

Moreover, the \$2.8 billion figure is more than \$200 million less than the Administration's own recommendation of one year ago, approximately \$700 million less than the level authorized for FY 1996, and \$600 million less (or 21 percent lower) than Clinton's own Joint Chiefs of Staff's recommendation for FY 1997 as outlined in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review. Indeed, these funding reductions raise serious questions about this Administration's commitment to achieving any type of ballistic missile defense program.

Also, the President's budget request includes only \$508 million specifically for national missile defense. In erroneously stating that he will spend \$3 billion per year on national missile defense, the President is perhaps trying to give the impression that he supports deploying a system to defend Americans. In fact, there is no commitment from this Administration to deploy a national missile defense system.

Finally, the \$508 million requested in FY 1997 for NMD is 37 percent less than the amount the Senate Armed Services Committee has provided in this year's authorization bill, and is a 39-percent reduction from the amount signed into law for FY 1996.

## **President's Statement: First Priority Is Existing Threats**

"Our first priority is to defend against existing or near-term threats like short- and medium-range missile attacks on our troops in the field or our allies. And we are, with upgraded Patriot missiles, the Navy Lower and Upper Tier, and the Army THAAD."

#### Reality Check

Four Theater Missile Defense (TMD) programs — the upgraded Patriot (PAC-3), Navy Lower Tier, Navy Upper Tier and the Army Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) — are statutory "core" programs. The FY 1997 budget request is not only lower than the amount signed into law for these programs for FY 1996, but lower than even the President's own FY 1996 budget request. These facts speak louder than the President's questionable assertions on his commitment to TMD.

Only some of what the President says is true. While the Administration has added \$240 million for the upgraded PAC-3 system over the five-year plan, after accounting for inflation, it has reduced significantly the budget for THAAD, the most advanced system. In the case of THAAD, the budget cut translates into a six-year delay for this system coming on line (2006 instead of 2000, as required by law).

According to Paul Kaminski, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology:

"With respect to the THAAD system, this is the most mature of our upper-tier systems... We reduced the total funding in the FYDP for this program by about \$2 billion—removing about two billion from a \$4.7 billion program." [Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on the 1996 Ballistic Missile Defense Update Review, 3/6/96] In the same hearing, Mr. Kaminski admitted that this cut "is a very significant reduction—no doubt about that."

As for the Navy Upper Tier system, the Administration recommended FY 1996 funding at \$30 million. Congress voted to add \$170 million to accelerate the development and production of this promising program last year. The Administration has refused to follow this directive — by not making it part of the Core TMD program with an accelerated schedule — and has kept Navy Upper Tier a technology program only.

The bottom line is that the President and his advisors have refused to provide a level of funding sufficient to comply with statute. The President's lack of respect for the law comes as no surprise; his brazen contempt for TMD statute makes clear his lack of commitment even to TMD.

Finally, not only are the budgets for promising theater systems being cut, but the Administration is following an arms control policy that would likely prohibit them from being deployed. Clinton arms control officials are negotiating a deal with Russia that could expand the scope of the outdated 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, thereby limiting the most promising theater ballistic missile systems the United States could deploy. The 1972 ABM Treaty does not, and was never intended to, limit theater ballistic missile interceptors.

## President's Statement: Threat to America a Decade Away

"The possibility of a long-range missile attack on American soil by a rogue state is more than a decade away."

### Reality Check

The President's statement misrepresents a 1995 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE).

- President Clinton focuses the time frame ("more than a decade away") for a long-range missile attack on the **continental United States** as if Alaska and Hawaii are not part of this nation. According to testimony in 1994 by John Deutch, then Deputy Secretary of Defense, "If the North Koreans field the Taepo Dong 2 missile, Guam, Alaska and parts of Hawaii would potentially be at risk" [Hearing Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 8/11/94]. At the same time, the NIE acknowledges a near-term missile threat to Alaska and Hawaii.
- Moreover, such limited focus is misleading, as illustrated by the words of President Clinton's first Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey:
  - "... the 'contiguous 48' frame of reference for this NIE, if the document is used as a basis for drawing general policy conclusions, can lead to a badly distorted and minimized perception of the serious threats we face from ballistic missiles now and in the very near future threats to our friends, our allies, our overseas bases and military forces, our overseas territories, and some of the 50 states."

    [Statement before the House Committee on National Security, 3/14/96]
- President Clinton ignores the existence of technology transfer. Secretary of Defense William Perry admitted recently that the intelligence community's estimate "could be foreshortened if any of those nations were able... to get direct assistance from countries that already have [such systems], either sending them missiles, selling them missiles, or giving them an important component or technology assistance" [Hearing Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 3/5/96].

Here, recent history is instructive: Iraq bought SCUDs used in the Gulf War from Russia, and upgraded them with China's help; some claim that North Korea's missiles were also built with Russian and Chinese aid.

• What should we make, then, of the Clinton Executive Order (#12938, of November 1994, renewed on November of 1995) finding "the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and of the means of delivering such weapons, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat." Clinton is shouting fire; why does he refuse to send the fire trucks?

## Clinton Statement: Commitment to Developing NMD System

"To prevent it [the possibility of a long-range missile attack on American soil], we are committed to developing by the year 2000 the defensive system that could be deployed by 2003, well before the threat becomes real."

#### Reality Check

The President's defense plan calls for a **reduction in funding for NMD** from the preceding year, in each of the next three years. Furthermore, the President's budget plan for national missile defense both lacks the funding needed to support the deployment of a national missile defense system by 2003, and fails to put the United States in a position to make a decision in 2000 that is fundamentally more informed than today.

Some courageous members of the President's own party are willing to speak out against the President's "say one thing, do another" approach to NMD. Jim Woolsey, Clinton's first Director of Central Intelligence, said in testimony before the House National Security Committee on March 14, 1996:

"Ballistic missiles can, and in the future they increasingly will, be used by hostile states for blackmail, terror, and to drive wedges between us and our friends and allies. It is my judgment that the Administration is not currently giving this vital problem the proper weight it deserves."

## Clinton Statement: No Threat to U.S. By Russian Missiles

"Already there are no Russian missiles pointed at our cities or our citizens."

## Reality Check

This statement is completely misleading — for while Moscow has agreed to not target the United States with its missiles, should a crisis break out, Russian weaponry could immediately be re-targeted against the United States. And China's intercontinental ballistic missiles are still targeted against the United States, meaning the threat of an accidental or unauthorized ballistic missile attack cannot and should not be dismissed.

## Clinton Statement: Republican Plan Costly and Obsolete

"I know that there are those who disagree with this policy. They have a plan that Congress will take up this week that would force us to choose now a costly missile defense system that could be obsolete tomorrow. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that this cost will be between \$30 and \$60 billion."

## Reality Check

The President errs on several points here. First, the Defend America Act he is referring to does not "force us to choose now" a system that could be obsolete tomorrow. In fact, S. 1635 leaves the decision about the type of system to be deployed up to the Secretary of Defense, merely committing the United States to defend America by 2003.

Second, as Senator Dole correctly observes:

"... Making a decision to go forward with missile defense now will not, as the President argued yesterday, lead to America deploying an obsolete system.

"The programs we currently have in development can serve as the building blocks for a system that meets the missile threat as it emerges. Furthermore, as with the procurement of any weapons system, moving from development to deployment requires lead time. You cannot do it in a week or a year. . . . The President's assertions contradict those of his own Secretary of Defense, who recently stated that these technologies 'would be quite capable of defending against the much smaller and relatively unsophisticated ICBM threat that a rogue or a terrorist could mount any time in the foreseeable future' "[Congressional Record — Senate, 5/23/96, S 5626].

Furthermore, President Clinton's own plan for national missile defense relies on the same technology and same development programs as those outlined in S. 1635. If the President knows of some new technologies that will mature within three years, he should identify them.

Third, as for cost, the \$31 billion-\$60 billion figure the President cites is from a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study that assumes a system consisting largely of advanced space-based components. Yet, while the Defend America Act includes space-based components among those the Defense Secretary must consider for inclusion in a national missile defense system, it does not require that they be part of such a system. The legislation does require (Section 4) that the Defense Secretary "develop for deployment an affordable and operationally effective national missile defense system. . . ." This can be done, according to the CBO study, for \$14 billion if the Secretary chooses a system that is ground-based, with 100 interceptors, four new ground-based radars and a constellation of Brilliant Eyes sensors.

#### Clinton Statement: GOP Plan Weakens Defense; Violates Treaties

"I believe this plan [the Defend America Act] is misguided. It would waste money. It would weaken our defenses by taking money away from things we know we need right now. It would violate the arms control agreements that we have made . . ."

### Reality Check

Cost is more a question of priorities, not affordability. President Clinton wants to spend the same amount of money on the U.S./European Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) as the Republicans want to spend on National Missile Defense during the same time frame. The real question is: do we really need a fifth Theater Ballistic Missile system more than a National Missile Defense system?

Moreover, if the President's misstatement weren't so serious, it would be laughable. Clinton says he is concerned about "weakening our defenses" but his defense budget request is \$18.6 billion less than last year's defense budget. And this is the same Administration that is threatening to veto the House-passed FY 1997 DoD Authorization bill because it adds \$12 billion to Clinton's defense budget.

Finally, nothing in S. 1635 violates, or recommends violation, of the 1972 ABM Treaty. In fact, the legislation urges the United States to discuss changes to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia if necessary, based upon the architecture selected by the Secretary of Defense. It is worth remembering that Articles 13, 14 and 15 of the ABM Treaty anticipate the need for changes to the Treaty and provide the means for such modifications. If these discussions are unsuccessful within one year, the bill merely calls upon the President and Congress, in consultation with each other, to consider exercising the option of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in accordance with Article XV of that treaty."

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[See attached opinion pieces on National Missile Defense by Senator Cochran and by columnist William Safire.]

# The Washington Post

Thad Cochran

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# Unready for Rogue Threats

When it comes to thinking about ballistic missile defense (BMD), most opponents of defending America are mired in the logic of the Cold War. Critics would do well to consider new ideas, as their old logic is inadequate for the emerging security environment.

If was suggested in an op-ed piece by Michael Krepon [The Last 15 Minutes," March 27] that the START process of reducing the number of Russian nuclear weapons should be a preferred alternative to national missile defense. This argument is, in fact, a staple from the past: The capability to defend against Soviet missiles was considered anathema to achieving U.S.-Soviet strategicamms control agreements, and therefore it was sacrificed for the goal of reducing Soviet nuclear arms through negotiation.

This position, questionable at the time, now ignores reality. It misses one of the primary features of the changed world: the proliferation of missiles and nuclear weapons to rogue states outside of the old East Bloc. The central point of the Defend America Act now before Congress is that American cities must be protected against those rogues now bent on acquiring long-range missiles and nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The START process does not help us here—it doesn't even apply.

START II, ratified by the Senate with overwhelming bipartisan support, cannot and does not

## Taking Exception

intend to take a single missile or mass-destruction weapon out of the hands of countries such as North Korea, Iran and Libya. The Defend America Act calls for defenses against the limited missile arsenals existing and sought by such rogue states. The notion is also put forward that we should focus on various multilateral nonproliferation measures instead of national missile defense. Again, the old Cold War debating tactic of pitting diplomatic efforts against BMD shines through And again, it does not fit the new world. We know that diplomatic efforts to prevent the spread of missile technology alone are inadequate to address the proliferation threat.

Despite some modest diplomatic successes, such as with the Missile Technology Control Regime, the list of countries acquiring missiles and mass-destruction weapons continues to grow. Rogue states have proven themselves capable of sidestepping our diplomatic nonproliferation measures. For example, inspectors in Iraq, the world's most heavily inspected regime, have been on the ground for years, yet we are regularly surprised by new revelations of previously unknown Iraqi proliferation efforts.

Diplomatic efforts to help slow the pace of proliferation must continue. But nobody should be fooled into believing that arms control agreements alone can solve the problem; and nobody should be fooled by the old Cold War argument that missile defense must be sacrificed to pursue various arms control efforts. This is not an either/or choice, as the critics would like us to believe.

It should be common knowledge, but it isn't, that America has no operational national missile defense system. Consequently, because we cannot be confident in our various diplomatic efforts to stop missiles before the "last 15 minutes" of their deadly flight, it makes sense to focus attention and resources now on the capability to intercept missiles and warheads before they reach their targets. The proliferation of missiles and mass-destruction weapons now makes missile defenses essential to American security.

Some argue that there is no missile threat to the United States for the foreseeable future. This notion comes on the heels of statements by Chinese officials to American officials that the United States would not support Taiwan in a crisis because of the Chinese capability to "rain nuclear bombs on Los Angeles." It also ignores the fact that, according to U.S. intelligence estimates and private accounts, the North Koreans have in development a missile that, when operational, will be able to target parts of the United States. In the past, the North Koreans have sold missiles to anybody with the cash to pay. How far and wide might this missile be sold? Nobody inside or outside the intelligence community knows.

We do know that North Korea has sold its missiles to rogue states in the past, including Iran. We also know that Libya's Gadhafi and Saddam Hussein have both expressed their longing for missiles and nuclear weapons with which to threaten the United States, and willing sources of technology and brain power exist to help them.

For America to delay moving ahead on BMD until multiple rogue missile threats emerge—and there is consensus in the intelligence community that such is the case—carries high risks that Americans need not be vulnerable to.

Some think tanks may be able to convince American leaders that they should not worry about emerging missile threats, but providing for the common defense is a constitutional responsibility those in authority dare not forfeit or ignore. That is why I support the Defend America Act, and that is why the president should sign it.

The writer, a Republican senator from Mississippi, is chairman of the Senate Republican Conference and a member of the appropriations subcommittee on defense. WILLIAM SAFIRE

## Defenseless America

WASHINGTON

The United States has no defense against an incoming ballistic missile. That's because we are frozen in a decade-old debate now devoid of meaning.

When President Reagan proposed a space-based defense in 1983, his plan was derided as "Star Wars," not only upsetting the theory of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), but technologically impossible — what system could stop thousands of incoming Soviet missiles?

Today, the threat is not from a superpower's thousands, but from a rogue state's handful; or from an accidental or misinformed launch following the sort of false alarm that went directly to Boris Yeltsin's nuclear "suitcase" in January of this year, responding to a Norwegian scientific rocket test; or from a group of terrorists who buy or steal one of Russia's 400 SS-25 mobile launchers and equip it with a nuclear or biological warhead.

We are using yesterday's strategic doctrine to fail to confront tomorrow's threat. Retaliation's fear stops a rational attacker; it does not deter the fanatic.

Consider the President who receives a nuclear missile threat from an Iraq or North Korea or Hezboliah. He could treat it as a bluff — at huge risk to an American city. He could counter-threaten to wipe the offending nation off the face of the earth — but suicidal fanatics don't care, and millions of Americans would not live to enjoy the terrible vengeance.

We are defenseless by design. That affects our diplomacy in a crisis. When a Chinese official warned recently that any intervention by us to protect Taiwan would endanger Los Angeles, that had to be factored into our readiness to send our ships through the Strait. We refused to take that threat seriously; someday we will have to take such a statement dead seriously.

If only, a future President will say, I had the ability to shoot down an incoming missile or two or three. That very capacity would stop nuclear blackmailing, and the President would not be forced to take a chance with the lives of millions of U.S. citizens.

Why don't we have space-based defense, now that we know it is practicable? The argument that it costs too much would vaporize with the first explosion. Another argument is that terrorists would not use missiles but would smuggle in hombs; maybe so, and we need defenses for that, but the most obvious threat is from the air. Because there is no perfect armor should not mean we stand naked.

The real reason we spend billions for missile defense research and not one cent for deployment is that Democrats still treat opposition as a litmus test of anti-cold-warriorism. Now our military intelligence is being twisted to fit the outdated don't-kill, don't-deploy straddle.

Can rogue-state missiles reach our shores? In August 1994 John Deutch, then Deputy Secretary of Defense, testified that "If the North Koreans field the Taepo Dong 2 missile, Guam, Alaska and parts of Hawaii would potentially be at risk." Later

## No answer to 'Incoming!'

C.I.A. testimony estimated deployment well before the year 2000.

Then Deutch became Director of Central Intelligence and shaded his estimate to make it less alarming. "In the next 15 years," stated Richard N. Cooper of his National Intelligence Council, "no country other than the major declared nuclear: powers will develop a ballistic missile that could threaten the contiguous 48 states..." That was based on last December's egregious National Intelligence Estimate 95-19.

Citizens of Alaska and Hawait might be distressed to learn that Bill Clinton considers their defense less important than that of us contiguous Americans. But the not-to-worry new attitude reminds me of emanations from the C.I.A. five years ago, when warnings were posted in this space of nuclear bombs being built in Iraq: "not for 5 to 10 years," was the word from Langley, as Saddam was rapidly becoming a nuclear power.

Now Congress is legislating a "Team B" to reassess complacency about missile threats, which Deutch accepts to avoid a dreaded G.A.O. investigation of politics in estimates. That means more delay and extended defenselessness.

The need for missile defense defines the two parties; the issue should be drawn in the campaign. Nuclear defense too expensive? Use 25 percent of the intelligence budget to put a shield over our heads.

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